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ABSTRACT

Misperception clouds good decision-making in international politics. American
foreign policy doesn’t currently allow for ample strategic communication training for the
President of the United States to prevent misperception from becoming an issue in
international relations. Looking at influential political theorists, it’s easy to discover that
they all warn of the detriment that comes with an ineffective communicator in the highest
power position in the country.
My research provides an overview of different perceptions formed by the United
States and China of each other throughout the Presidency of Donald Trump and his
counterpart in Beijing, President Xi Jinping. By analyzing the official press releases of
each country about the foreign policy moves of the other, I was able to discover the
points of weak policy where relations plummeted and where ‘sunshine politics’ prevailed,
allowing for further development in the relationship between the two countries’ leaders.
When the two leaders were sticking to their agreement of having frequent
meetings involving dialogue that both countries held in high precedent, perceptions were
positive and relations were amicable. The opposite happened when the dialogue was
infrequent and American Message-Influence foreign policy prevailed (Corman, 2008)
where there was increased unilateral action towards China without dialogue.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The United States has a communication problem.
As the country is struggling to hold its stance as the global hegemon, American
spokespeople are distancing themselves, and the whole country, from the world (Corman
and Trethewey, A New Communication Model For The 21st Century, 156)1. Without a
communication strategy that focuses on global cooperation, diplomacy will be unreliable
in promoting the country’s international image as the protector of democracy and
freedom.
Recent cases of ill-communicated intentions have led America to propagate
conflict in numerous ways. Our allies in Europe have become more unwilling to defer to
American leadership and have actively distanced themselves from the U.S. sphere of
influence. President Trump’s attendance last May for the 2017 NATO Summit and his
refusal to reaffirm NATO’s famous Article 5, the guarantee of mutual defense, left
German Chancellor Angela Merkel pessimistic about U.S. leadership. She announced in
an impromptu press conference afterwards that, “The times in which we could
completely depend on others are on the way out… We Europeans truly have to take our

1

This thought came from the text Stephen Corman and Angela Trethewey’s essay, A New Communication
Model For The 21st Century, (Peter Lang Publishing, 2008) where they describe that the current American
international communication strategy could be based off of their theory of the Message-Influence Model
that describes the United States’ spokespeople as communicating ideas to foreign nations without properly
conveying the intended meaning, so both sides grow in conflict because their perceptions differ so greatly
from their dialogue. I don’t agree with the label it throws over all American diplomatic communication, but
the focus on the “meaning-making” process prompted my research into the ways our dialogue is
inefficiently conducted.
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fate into our own hands.” (Frum, The Atlantic, May 2017). This was a decisive landmark
indicator of leadership decline.
More conflicts continue unresolved with little diplomatic effort left in the United
States to repair broken relations constructively. Afghanistan has been the longest standing
war in American history, encouraged by the foreign policy spokespeople2 of both sides of
the aisle to continue the war (Joyner, The Atlantic, May 2011). This interventionist
foreign policy has persisted since the Cold War ended and has helped the United States
keep to its guns to solve the War on Terror.
While still handling the old war, the president and his foreign policy actions have
been flirting with revisiting conflict in North Korea. Denouncing previous
administrations’ efforts, the current administration has demanded crushing sanctions be
implemented by U.N. Security Council members on North Korea (Lynch and De Luce,
Foreign Policy, April 2017). This continues even after Secretary Tillerson’s sacking. This
has been supplemented by belittling language between the two countries’ leaders without
any productive attempts at peace building or understanding. All of these foreign policy
methods are counterintuitive to the international position of peace we advertise
(Whitehead, 6).
The United States has a communication problem and the public is interested in
knowing why. Since the United States played its crucial role in ending World War II, it’s
enjoyed being a unilateral actor in international politics, and even more so after the Cold

James Joyner, founder and editor-in-chief of the weblog Outside The Beltway, denominates the two
political groups who’ve become most prominent in U.S. foreign policy to create these destructive
communication methods: neoconservatives and liberal interventionists. Neoconservatives as perpetuating
war in order to spread American ideologies through permanent marks in left by the military. Liberal
interventionists center around the Responsibility to Protect individuals abroad against their governments
and military groups. Both have a readily available war option.
2

2

War. New trends of interstate relations have become decreasingly compromising and
more dividing than ever before. In attempt to draw the hardline argument, American
executive and ambassadorial representatives are sending messages to other countries of
national prioritization. Allies and adversaries alike are being subject to the distancing
that’s taking place, which declines hope for a more unified world.
This strategy is a clear abandonment of the nation’s soft power that is gravely
wounded. ‘Soft Power’, is a term coined by Joseph Nye in 1990, “which occurs when one
country gets other countries to want what it wants… in contrast with the hard or
command power of ordering others to do what it wants.” (Nye, Foreign Affairs, 2004).
This is a delicate power. Having a cooperative relationship between two counties is a
virtue of trust building and understanding, but it’s crucial to human existence.
Our declining ‘Soft Power’ is the bottom line motivation to create institutional
change in government. Non-governmental organizations and government liaison councils
have been attempted and failed. In 2004, the Council on Foreign Relations recommended
creating a "White House Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure," led by a
presidentially appointed head, and a nonprofit "Corporation for Public Diplomacy" for
the private sector to maintain outreach (Nye, Foreign Affairs, 2004). Neither of these
suggestions were put into action. According to a Gallup poll done in January 2018 of 134
countries, median percentage approval for U.S. leadership dropped to 30% from 48% in
2016 (Ray, Gallup, 2018). Since the newly elected administration came into power, the
ratings have continued sliding down to new lows in American confidence (Ray, Gallup,
2018).
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To find a trajectory that will restore American leadership confidence, the world
and the United States must be able to express their own worldviews and listen to each
other. This cooperation can best be achieved through utilizing a communication process
that is already well-used in international affairs between high ranking individuals.
Interpersonal Communication is a process that has no beginning or end, moving through
different stages in competence of one’s own emotions and the emotions of the other
participants in the conflict (Trenholm et Jensen, Interpersonal Communication, 5). The
specific model of communication that I’m proposing in my research is the Model of
Communication Competence designed by the leading academics in communication
science, Sarah Trenholm and Arthur Jensen, for use by the president and the cabinet.
They must be trained in this communication form to lead and represent the United States
with awareness when communicating with leaders of other nations.
Made clear by the lack of this strategic practice, the literature on the functions and
benefits of this strategy is virtually non-existent. The idea that heads of state should
follow a process that allows all parties to be legitimized in negotiation is a threat to the
identities of participants, and thus a non-starter in its consideration as a viable practice3.
In multiple studies by the Harvard International Negotiation Program, the identity

This comes from the ‘Tribes Effect’ that was outlined in Negotiating the Nonnegotiable: How to Resolve
Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts by founder and director of the Harvard International Negotiation
Program, Daniel Shapiro. The ‘Tribes Effect’ outlined the main levels for conflict resolution to be
rationality, emotions, and identity. Primarily and on the surface level, people try to resolve conflicts
rationally to maximize mutual gains. But if this fails, each level poses new more difficult challenges to
resolve. Emotions cloud judgement and rationality, but with proper emotional awareness can tell you when
a situation is working in your favor or something ethereal is obstructing further progress. Finally, the issue
of identity is the most difficult to reconcile. This behavior model is crucial to understand in the realm of
this thesis because it’s something virtually unchangeable in the human consciousness. It deals with the
principle of human need to find meaning in their existence, which involves devotion to religious, cultural
and ethical value systems that supersede all other variables in their lives.
3
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becomes the indicator of who you are and most defended aspect of yourself (Shapiro,
Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, pp. 7-10). This is exactly what Trenholm and Jensen
address with the Model of Communication Competence and its intention to unlock
identity to create transparency between all negotiation parties and minimize all forms of
misperception. Chapter Two will focus on the theoretical explanation of this model and
its applicability in foreign policy.
The Foreign Service and the Department of State are tasked with managing and
creating foreign policy decisions for the president and the executive offices (Childs,
American Foreign Service, 36). Developed interpersonal communication skills is already
a prerequisite for working in the State Department. Extending this necessary skill set to
executive positions is a natural next step to improve international competence. In Chapter
Three, the case will be made to exemplify the successes associated with foreign policy
practiced through the State Department’s use of interpersonal communication and that the
way the method taught to diplomats and foreign service officers is an exemplary way of
training good dialogue practiced to the president and members of the cabinet.
Chapter Four is where the prominent research of my thesis is tested. To support
my claim for executive interpersonal relations training, I’ve outlined a crucial case in
international politics with an outcome that is greatly dependent on negotiation. America’s
relations with China have been on the forefront of many political analysts’ research and
the advice from experts on what policies to adopt is continuously mixed. My research is
analyzing the communication styles of the United States and of China by dissecting the
press releases about each other and determining which tactics foster the friendliest
bilateral relations. I will be analyzing the agreements, disagreements and tone of the press
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releases from the executive offices of the United States and China during the presidential
term of Donald Trump. My methodology assigns a number to each press release using the
5-point Likert Scale based on the number of new agreements, revisited agreements,
revisited disagreements, and new disagreements that determine the successes of ideas
that’ve been communicated between the two negotiating parties to come to a consensus.
The grading scale and details on the rubric used are explained further later in this chapter.
Then in Chapter Five, I will discuss how an ideal function of international
negotiation will become like how Truth and Reconciliation Commissions operate to
dissolve conflict and lay ground work of non-violence. Using the successful example of
the first commission established in post-apartheid South Africa, the benefits of choosing
“peace over justice” are historically proven to unite two sides of a deeply dividing
conflict such as national racial relations (Hayner, International Review of the Red Cross,
2006). This example will provide context to my claim of promoting interpersonal
communication in international politics and frame the way the United States can better its
foreign policy in order to propagate world peace.

6

REFERENCES

1. Nye, Joseph S. Jr., “Soft Power”, Foreign Policy, No. 80, Twentieth Anniversary
(Autumn, 1990), pp. 153-171
2. Corman, Stephen R.; Trethewey, Angela Goodall, H. L. A New Communication
Model For The 21st Century, Peter Lang Publishing, 2008
3. Frum, David, “Trump's Trip Was a Catastrophe for U.S.-Europe Relations”, The
Atlantic, May 28th, 2017, link:
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-natogermany/528429/
4. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript%20%20February%2015%2C%202018.pdf
5. Whitehead, Laurence, The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and
the Americas, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996
6. Childs, J. Rives, American Foreign Service, Henry Holt and Company, New York
1947
7. Shapiro, Daniel, Negotiating the Nonnegotiable, Penguin Random House, Viking
2016
8. Calamur, Krishnadev, “A Short History of 'America First’”, The Atlantic, Jan 21,
2017, source link:
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-americafirst/514037/
9. Simon, Scott, “Evaluating Trump's 'America First' Trade Policies”, NPR radio show
transcript of The Weekend Edition, January 27, 2018, source link:
https://www.npr.org/2018/01/27/581269019/evaluating-trumps-america-firsttrade-policies
10. Jackson, James K., “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Analysis of Economic
Studies”, Cornell University ILR School, 2016
11. Kennedy, Scott, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus”, Journal of Contemporary
China (2010), 19(65), June, 461–477,
12. Allison, Graham, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape the
Thucydides’s Trap?, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Press, Boston 2017

7

CHAPTER TWO

THEORY

The topic of effective methods of negotiation is pertinent because of the amazing
need for understanding communications in a politically, socially, and culturally
globalized world. These types of dialogue are used to solve the world’s toughest
problems in territory negotiations, peace talks, climate change discussion, and all
internationally pertinent issues that require collaboration between nations. Research in
this field is deeply important to the security of the United States, and how heads of state
can be prepared to handle contentious issues. I evaluate the most effective
communication strategies for maintaining and promoting peace to implement in highpressure international, political and diplomatic negotiation between representatives of the
United States and leaders that represent foreign nations. In this chapter, I will focus on
the crucial theoretical origins of international relations theory in accordance with
advanced realist thinking. Then with an analysis of the existing communication
methodology literature, an explanation of the theoretical arguments behind the
communication methods being used contemporarily in liberal international relations
theory. Finally, the theoretical framework of the communication model I believed to be
the most effective and universally beneficial communication method in my preliminary
research.
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Misperception: The Bread and Butter Of Conflict
The realist school of thought in international relations is based on an anarchic
international system. There is only so much that can be done to regulate the fighting
between nations and whether or not they can attain peace after they’ve engaged in
conflict. Central to these conflicts, why they start and why they end, is the perception and
trust the two nations have with each other. When misperceptions seem more factual than
speculative, a dangerous transformation occurs and the two countries become more
unwilling to hear from the other side of the conflict. These notions are built into widely
accepted realist international relations theory to explain the rationality of why nations
choose war. This section outlines great realist theory that try to explain why
misperception exists and the destruction it can cause if it goes unsolved. Waltz,
Meirshiemer, Copeland, Morganthau, and Allison and Thucydides are the primary
theorists that I will be using to discuss how misperception is central to realist
international relations theory.
Kenneth Waltz is the preeminent scholar of the post-war era in international
relations theory and has influenced numerous politicians and other theorists (Walt,
“Kenneth N. Waltz, 1924-2013”, Foreign Policy, 2013). His career was kicked off by his
published book, Man, the State and War in 1959 when he outlined one of his most important
theoretical analyses of his time. Waltz proposed that there are three lenses, or ‘images’ of
theoretical analysis when it comes to why conflict and war occurs, each more effective than the
last.
The first image is ‘Man’, or the individual, that has huge consequence on the
political sway of a nation-state. The charisma, decisiveness and common sense a person
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has is defining for how the leadership role will be carried out. Conflict that is coaxed by
individuals can be because of the nature of political leaders. He exemplifies Hitler and
Napoleon in this part, and their psychology being relative to the time period of angst,
need for dominance and a superiority complex4.
The second image is ‘State’, which is usually a nation-state made of people with
common history, culture and/or language, and a presiding government. States have
movements and surges of nationalism dependent on other nations around it, driving
competition and bolstering rhetoric of, again, superiority. Waltz argues that colonialism
was a state’s need to expand its enterprises and spread culture to the weak.
The third and inarguably most important image was the International System. He
claimed that this is the originator of war, and that because the international system is
anarchical, there’s nothing to prevent war from happening. Thus this permits all other
theories of war to be permissible. Nothing can stop war other than the realization that war
isn’t what the people want. What perpetuates the necessity to be prepared for a war is its
uncertainty. The possibility exists as long as there is distrust in the other state, which can
lead to something as dangerous as a security dilemma (Herz, Political Realism and
Political Idealism: a Study in Theories and Realities, 1951). The security dilemma is an
important aspect in exemplifying misperception in international relations, also described
by Herz as the Spiral Model, is defined as the distrustful relations countries form by
increasing military strength to make the other country increase its military strength. This

The main body of my research stems from the first image being a key element in how other nations
perceive the United States. Representing the will of the United States is the primary job of the president of
each country. Xi Jinping and Donald Trump make invaluable impressions for the people of the other
country about the one they represent, and it’s because of the platform they’re given as described by
Kenneth Waltz’s theory.
4
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causes tension between the two countries to grow and reason for reconciliation to worsen
to the point where they have no trust left between them. This creates a void where trust
once belonged, but now conflict can grow and possibly lead to war.
Another great theorist in realist international relations is John Meirsheimer who
originated ‘Offensive Realism’, founding that states look to gain power over others at the
expense of other states (Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001). He
delineates that states can never be certain about other states' intentions, which causes
misperceptions, and leads to rising conflicts. He also describes how the United States has
become a vessel for textbook liberal foreign policy because of the optimistic worldview
we claim and how we use it to motivate our government and non-state actors to help
improve national welfare and the world’s.
Another influential voice in realist political thought that contributes to the
definition of misperception is Dale Copeland, author of The Origins of Major War, and
strong proponent of the Balance of Power Theory. He says great powers that anticipate
deep and inevitable decline are more likely to initiate wars or hard-line policies that
substantially increase the risk of major war through inadvertent escalation (Copeland, The
Origins of Major War, 2000). This sentiment of inevitability that he describes is
attributed to feeling helpless in maintaining peace because it’s seemingly impossible to
avoid viewing the other side as a threat when observing them prepare for conflict. It’s as
if peering you’re out a train car window to see the train heading towards a track block
and the train isn’t slowing down to not crash into it.
Hans Morganthau is a classical realist whose realist theories took hold in the early
20th century (Morganthau, Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, 1946). He’s most notable
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for believing that conflict is based in human nature, and countries’ reactions to events or
uneven powers dynamics is to assert their dominance or stand their ground in the face of
conflict for their own survival. This school of thought is the purest realist creed in
international relations, and calls for the observation of certain objectivity in human
nature. He explains best in his quote from Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for
Power and Peace:
Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. In
order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by
which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to
our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure.
(Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace, 1978, pg. 4)
In his book, he takes this notion of objective laws rooted in human nature and
expands it to include survivalism in the context of observing when other nations are
preparing for military conflict without explanation. He argues that misperception is very
likely to happen in international politics because human nature prompts us to jump to
conclusions of high cost for the sake of survival. Whether or not action is taken by the
nation is influenced heavily by the head of state, even in the highest-functioning
democracies.
Lastly, of the most notable realist international relations theorists who speak about
misperception and its effects, Graham Allison and Thucydides, two prolific academics
separated by thousands of years of international diplomatic and war history agree on a
very particular theory. Coined as the Thucydides Trap, the ancient Greek historian told
his History of the Peloponnesian War and described how Athens was a rising power in a
Spartan-dominated region where their powers were beginning to conflict and the Sparta
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saw Athens’ potential to overtake the rank of regional hegemon (Thucydides, History of
the Peloponnesian War, 1910). It was this advanced anxiety about being overtaken by the
new might of Athens that allowed Sparta to believe that engaging in war has become
seemingly inevitable.
Allison takes this theory and sees its applicability in a variety of cases throughout history.
He builds a database of highly charged conflicts when a rising power threatened the
established power who declares war to prevent its own decline and because of the
security dilemma, as referenced previously by Herz and Waltz (Allison, Destined For
War: Can America and China Escape the Thucydides’s Trap?, 2017). He discusses this
scenario in the case study of China, being a riding power, and the United States, being
challenged as an established power. His data of China’s rise is irrefutable, claiming that
the United States has been left behind in purchasing power parity (PPP), number of active
duty military, and although many of Allison’s descriptions and assumptions of China
have been claimed to be exaggerated, professional economists and foreign policy wonks
are at least weary about the data projections (Buruma, Ian, “Are China and the United
States Headed for War?”, The New Yorker, 2017). Allison describes the nervous
reasoning that many tense relations where the United States is predicted to be
economically eclipsed by China in the next two decades, many countries have succumbed
to the Thucydides’ Trap under less grave circumstances. It’s believed that the cost of war
would be too high to enter a great power conflict at this point in military technological
development (Buruma, 2017). As tensions in East Asian politics, economic competition,
and proxy conflicts continue rising, he warns that small frictions have the potential to
amplify under high-pressure context and become explosive.
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Misperception is one of the most dangerous symptoms of pre-war conditions that
realist international theorists describe and nearly all of them warn of this reality. Realists
claim that to defend against misperception and the cause of war, transparency is
necessary to build trust between nations. Although the realist agenda doesn’t prescribe
supranational organizations to manage interstate affairs to dilute conflict potential, they
do promote bilateral trust building, which calls for both nations understanding each
other’s perspectives.
Liberal and Contemporary Theory Reacts
Realist international relations theory has roots in human nature being the
foundation for all international decisions made by a country, and which allows for
misperception to take place. Liberal international relations decree that there’s more at
work than just human nature, and that to maintain peace, freedom and human rights
promotes this cooperation between nations. Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Paine,
Immanuel Kant in the 1700s and more recent theorists like Andrew Moravcsik and
Francis Fukuyama advocate that there are major variables within the international system
that help support peace and that help deteriorate it that go beyond human nature.
Misperception isn’t delineated as a core variable by liberal theorists, but that there must
be transparency in the behavior of nations to maintain peace.
Moravesik attributes liberal international relations theory as being a “bottom-up”
approach to how relationships between countries are formed (Moravcsik, “Taking
Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics”, International
Organization, 1997). The two assumptions within liberalism that define the school of
thought are that the core actors in international relations are the individuals and
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prosperous groups that make intra-national relations possible, and second, that the
political institutions that run every state represent a particular subset of the country it
represents and not the whole will of the people (Moravcsik, 1997). These two basic
assumptions fuel liberal concerns of how easily a head of state can undermine the
positive development fostered by intra-national leaders and that they can do this without
having full consent from their constituents. This leaves a wide berth for nations to
misperceive each other’s intentions and the real will of the people, which most theorists
agree is to remain alive and not at war.
The other notable liberal international relations theorist who is crucial to this
literature analysis of misperception is Francis Fukuyama who professed that liberalism
has become the global thought that allows other thoughts to exist but not prevail over it
(Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest, 1989). It’s owed to “Common
Marketization” that has brought the whole world into the global market sphere and made
trade the diplomacy that links everyone together, becoming the single most effective
deterrent to war in the world. He warns readers in his article:
Failure to understand that the roots of economic behavior lie in the
realm of consciousness and culture leads to the common mistake of
attributing material causes to phenomena that are essentially ideal in
nature. (Fukuyama, 1989)
Maintaining healthy economics already prevents the majority of risky political moves,
but when economics and politics turn unhealthy between two countries, what happens to
relations? What prevents them from sparking conflict? This question made me turn to
modern communication strategies and theories to search further for an answer.
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Reviewing literature on the topic of international political communication means
getting a broad and specific understanding of mistakes and theories of the negotiation
process that could help expand our perspective of human interaction. We must observe an
essential problem at the forefront of U.S. rhetoric that expresses distrust and instigates
alienation towards foreigners (Hess, Aaron; Justus, H. S. Redefining The Long War:
Toward a New Vocabulary of International Terrorism, 2008) in the words that are used
by spokespeople and leaders of the American government. Aaron Hess proposes the
assembly of a new list of vocabulary to be used by the U.S. government when speaking
about issues like terrorism and especially the actions of our military against people who
live in these origins of mass terror groups formed against the West. He makes one thing
critical; that the U.S. must refer to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as what it is by
definition: a global problem, not a problem of America against the world. This way,
there’s less targeting of languages and regions, makes it easier and more profitable to
determine success, reduces a ‘terrorist’ to just a criminal, and creates a broader
partnership within the international community against smaller and unjust group of
people.
Specifically, the authors propose that terrorists should be scrutinized under the
international laws in place that incriminate them that have been decided on by a global
judicial body such as the ICJ. This way, citizens sympathize with more multilateral
efforts and organizations to fight in unity against injustice and no one wants to join a
futile and desperate movement to destabilize a strong, united world. This exemplifies the
importance of diction in constructive and wise communication as a function of peace and
consensus. Political dialogue has necessary communication outlines of which, if not
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adhered to, will deconstruct progress and set people further apart from understanding the
other’s point of view.
Critically important to exploring available methodologies in international
communication is analyzing those already used in the United States Department of State.
Esteemed political science academics, Tretheway and Corman, described the
department’s rhetoric and communication using the message-influence model,
characterized as projecting agendas or manipulating circumstances in order to attain selforiented goals without a negotiation partner’s consent. The new communication method
that they see would be more globally-minded is the pragmatic complexity model
(Tretheway, Corman, A New Communication Model For The 21st Century, 2008), which
is the agreement between participants to form an active resolution that the two sides must
always feel is mutually beneficial, or the resolution must be renegotiated.
These two methods are excellent examples of methods already put in place in the
international political landscape and that create a great base for my proposition, by
adding interpersonal communication. The authors described the United States’
communication methods as a “nation to other nations” (Baxter, Braithwaite, Engaging
Theories in Interpersonal Communication: Multiple Perspectives, 2008), saying that
although the country is portrayed as a credible source and the most powerful single voice
on the international stage, the country must work to down play its influences to a lowcredibility source. We must regain legitimacy as a credible power by changing our short
and long term communication strategies.
The goal is to cultivate constructive negotiation strategies that can be used across
platforms in international relations. In Corman et al.’s work, Weapons of Mass
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Persuasion: Strategic Communication to Combat Extremism, the authors reference the
Message Influence Model as being the current method of communication for
international negotiation for the U.S. government and the state department. The way the
strategy works is that when an American official conveys a proposition or idea to
someone representing a foreign entity, the message must demonstrate the power of the
United States and encourages them to understand the concept through the American
perspective. I agree with the authors’ sentiments that this is not beneficial for all
participants in discussion. Though, what I disagree with the authors on is their solution,
which was the Pragmatic Complexity Model, which illustrates joint gains being created
in the course of a deal will need to be allocated between the parties of that deal. It’s
centered around an agreement of “double contingency” that blocks a resolution
completely if one part of it is not agreed upon by both/all parties, which could create
endless gridlock. This is an example of what happens when the wrong communication
forms have been used for so long to persuade and manipulate others to heed our wills.
Avoiding these backtracks, it’s necessary to cast aside the ego of the vain “perceived
self” and create an equal value with negotiating partners.
We do not assume that influence and coercion are absent from negotiation by
definition, that parties always negotiate in good faith, or that negotiated agreements are
all “win-win” relative to the status quo. Using interpersonal communication makes goals
and favorable long term resolutions that yield better results when the negotiations are
inclusive and egalitarian. An excellent account I found in my research of a successful use
of this method was the Good Friday agreements negotiated by in Belfast, Northern
Ireland between the British and the Irish about the Northern Irish territory (Wolff, “The
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Road to Peace? The Good Friday Agreement and the Conflict in Northern Ireland”,
2001), which featured famously a long discussion between parliamentary members of
each nation mediated by United States special envoys to create a consensual agreement to
end terrorism in the region ad pacify the border region.
Another important article created a roadmap for a successful political dialogue by
American scholar, Andries Odendaal, shows necessary pre-conditions, present climate,
and post-resolution initiative for a lasting political consensus. He sets up the dialogue
steps as prerequisites for “objective, reliable analysis of the conflict” (Odendaal, The Role
of Political Dialogue in Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 2011), first by telling the
reader what to keep in mind throughout dialogue and to commit to “leadership and
inclusion” of all parties. The steps to follow for good dialogue first begins with
assembling pre-established groups to give input on the issue(s) being discussed, then
finding the proper mediator/mediating body, and finally applying the strategies to
interpersonal conflict resolution.
The scholar points out that this process laid out is also not rigid or authoritarian by
having outlines and rules. This type of political dialogue is the situation universally
beneficial ad applicable. Summit dialogue is used for high-tension negotiations of
interstate involvement and two track dialogue is between individuals or non-state actors
of concern to other nation states (Grarnham, Contribution to a Political Economy of
Mass-Communication, 1979). The multi-level dialogue is what would be most
exemplified in my working paper, because I want to include all levels of interstate
dialogue and bring it to an individual-based interpersonal level when it comes to leaders
debating amongst each other.
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To prove the applicability of my research findings, I read literary pieces on
intergroup dialogue outside the direct context of international relations and security so
see if there are aspects of civilian interactions that can be incorporated into improving
standards of diplomatic communication. I read about an inter-university group dialogue
organization formed in hopes of creating more tolerance and acceptance of all
communities involved in the university system and its community. Although this isn’t
directly in correlation with politics like the focus of my research, this is an excellent
example of how I propose nations work with one another. The organization’s historical
context has origins in schools across America creating inter-race and inter-faith groups in
wake of the massive changes thrust forward during Brown vs. The Board of Education
(1954). To diffuse tensions in educational and community environments, school boards
organized dialogue groups to discuss ways to integrate and overcome grievances of the
massive social change brought upon the nation by the Supreme Court decision.
What I researched explains that a lot of these groups founded in universities across
the country now still combat many racial and faith related issues and the groups continue
to serve this main function. The author interviewed several people unaffiliated with
groups that say that there’s a feeling of woe associated with being inactive and unknown
to the diversity of their own community (Gurin, et al. Intergroup Dialogue: Its Role in
Contemporary Society, 2013). This is the primary cause of barriers, prejudices and
xenophobic aggressions being formed in communities. I propose that this is very relatable
to the need for international discussion groups not only among political leaders elected,
but normal citizens from different countries. The details in the inter-community dialogue
situation serve as a great microcosm example of how international dialogue through
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group expression and familiarity will help people become more comfortable with one
another.
Another important communication aspect I explored in the body literature available
that has an effect on the outcome of international debate is the “Culture Industry” as a
marker of communication marketing that is changing the face of mass communication
and how governments express their ideas to their people and the world. The concept
suggests that the materialistic nature of new communication platforms which once was
the prevalence of television and radio, but it is now social media and smartphones
technology. communicating politics is changing to disseminate new information faster
and for more opinions to form more quickly. I would use this to create a platform for new
communication that can improve government accountability and honesty and help aid
relations with other nations, convincing the representatives to adopt a consensual
approach to international negotiations that would help promote empathy and
understanding.
Lastly and one of the most important areas of interest to think about in the context
of international political communication is the importance of the people in keeping
government communication transparent and reporting the truth to the common folk.
Democracy calls for the freedom of speech to maintain honest and open negotiations, this
author writes. He says that some selfishly campaigned politicians is that “the more they
communicate, the more they are doubted. Hence, the trust which is a fundamental to the
workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. I consider statistics and
philosophical examples of government distrust as being a non-starter for honest dialogue
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and communication, between the hierarchy of the international system as well as its own
people.
My theoretical analysis includes primary definitions of three different
communication types: the message-influence model, the pragmatic complexity model,
and interpersonal communication. The message-influence model is described as operating
like an old wire telephone, that the information source transmits information to the
receiver in the exact way and vision of the information source, without consideration of
the receiver or how the receiver’s perspective would interpret the information. The
pragmatic complexity model is based on an A discussant and a B discussant, where A and
B form a mutually-assured resolution agreement, but discussant A has more of the power
and direct stake in the conflict. A’s behavior is dependent on external conflict conditions
and B’s feelings and expressions, and B’s behavior is dependent almost completely on
A’s feelings on the situation. Lastly, interpersonal communication is the strategy of
projecting equality and consideration of all feelings and sentiments on the issue,
considering the matter an issue that must have a mutually consensual resolution to
succeed, independent of self-first oriented negotiation.
By the definition of Odell and Tingley, a political negotiation is successful when it
meets two criteria: at a minimum, parties reach a mutual-gain deal (Odell et al. Political
Negotiation, 2016) (one that would benefit the set of parties as a whole and many if not
all of them individually) when such a deal is feasible, and that the negotiation reaches a
deal that is more successful to the degree that it exhausts the potential for enhancing the
parties’ utilities.
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I propose that the communication method of interpersonal communication is the
best format and environment for all groups represented to discuss, listen, analyze, express
and observe all opinions on an international matter. This is also the best way to succeed
in resolving a conflict non-violently, because it allows participants in the discussion to
envision the other side(s) in their fullest humanity and compassion.
My hypothesis is a serious declaration that involves extensive background research
into the kinds of interpersonal communication that gives the accusation legitimacy. It’s
centered around the notion of conflict transformation, which is designed for ethical
peace-embedded justice centered around respect for human rights and life. Advocation
for non-violence is a way of life and work to supplement conflict transformation in
making human relationships bilateral and communicative. John Paul Lederachl, author of
The Little Book of Conflict Transformation, explains that three lenses are necessary to see
a situation fully in the moment to create the best solution to the issue (Lederach, The
Little Book of Conflict Transformation., 2003). First is the immediate situation, second is
the analyzation of the deeper relationship patterns creating the conflict, and third is the
framework that holds all perspectives together contributing to the conflict. Conflict is a
huge and natural part of human growth with each other and themselves. Mastering the
empathy and compassion for others and then using that to promote growth in each other
when there’s conflict makes a resolution that leaves all parties better off than when they
came together in the first place.
It is important to both envision and respond to incur growth in conflict resolution.
In international relations, diplomats negotiate in high stress situations often involving
deeply hostile sides of an issue. To keep peace dynamic, adaptive, and changing in
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resolution methods to find its most effective way, we must continue to analyze the
structure and transform the methods based on the observations of how the last attempt
went at resolving the international crises. Conflicts don’t get solved perfectly the first
time or any other time for that matter. Conflict transformation, by definition, is
relationship based, personal and experiential because it focuses on real core changes to
resolve issues so the long term effect can stay relevant and helpful, as opposed to conflict
resolution which is about relieving the pain of the current conflict through any possible
method without acknowledgment of the future cases that could come into view (Gaber et
al. Too Much of a Good Thing, 2007).
This aligns with the notion of progress being non-linear and that all normal parts of
the retrogression & the expression change in a conflict. An epicenter or core issue of a
conflict is a platform, which acts like a trampoline; very good to start from and jump into
the transformation process. We have a capacity to envision & to present issues as a
window that takes us beyond immediate situations by examining the situations in the long
term and that the whole “mountain range” of issues provides a bigger picture that is
imperative to compassion and maintaining the resolution attained. With this in mind, I’d
like to propose that the method(s) that should be used in international negotiation should
be respectful, considerate of all parties’ concerns, and able to apply to all people.
This project provides insight needed about an option in international conflict that is
often easily forgotten: that continuously acknowledging the humanity in others is a
realistic tactic that deserves more legitimacy that it receives. Interpersonal relations and
communication methods involve a step by step process that it backed by contentions of
non-violence. The kinds of negotiation that result in violence are the ones that promote
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emotional ignorance, belligerent self-centeredness, and insensitivity to others’ points of
view. How we move forward as a global society and a species is through the training of
emotional literacy in our elected leaders. Through these methods, we can achieve this and
incorporate it into the daily lives of all peoples.
Interpersonal Communication Theory: Peace Through Equality
Interpersonal Communication strategy has been developed to give all participants
in the process a platform to hear, be heard, and understand the conflict from all sides.
This theory has been developed and proven to effectively develop a working relationship
between people where they can move towards a consensus in any conflict. Formatted by
Dr. Sarah Trenholm and Dr. Arthur Jensen, the Model of Communicative Competence
incorporates five core elements of being proficient in interpersonal communication
(Trenholm and Jensen, Interpersonal Communication, 10). These focus points help
combat prejudice and ethnocentric tendencies that are in human behavioral patterns, and
that prevent productive problem-solving. Cross-cultural communication can be stifled
easily by assumptions that prevent productive discussion of issues that affect everyone in
the negotiations. Trenholm and Jensen have come up with the Model of Communicative
Competence which maps the internal competence needed to become fluent in this form of
communication.
The model, although not meant originally for international negotiation, is meant to
defuse tensions and bridge the gap for understanding between people from fundamentally
different backgrounds. Its basic purpose would be very useful in communications
between heads of state. Very often, as we’ve seen in the conclusions of acclaimed
theorists of international relations, heads of state make judgements and claims based on
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misperceptions caused by inaccurate or incomplete information which leads to conflict.
This process guides participants through their internal levels of decision-making to bring
them to the most informed conclusion to act upon.
On the next page, Figure 2.1 shows the Model of Communicative Competence
(Trenholm and Jensen, 10) mapped out to demonstrate the process one goes through to
generate informed communication, both receiving and sending. These steps in the process
are already parts of all communication and the point of this detailed outline is to improve
ones’ self-awareness in new situations and receptiveness to new ideas in dialogue. The
process begins in the model by receiving new information from an outside source and
interpreting it. This involves analyzing the situation and people providing the
information, understanding what the situation will potentially ask, and what is able to be
provided. The information flows from the interpretation competence throughout the chart
to address how the role, self, and goal competence interprets this information. Role
competence is analyzing placement in the situation, what advice or information to give,
and what behavior to exhibit in the environment to most accurately present ideas. Selfcompetence is central to understanding self-image, which is critical to how others
perceive one’s actions that are devastating to be misconstrued in negotiations. Goal
competence is delineating what the desired results are from their participation in dialogue
and becoming informed of the other participants’ goals as well. These three steps of the
process flow next into message competence, which involves the process of coding
internal decision-making and reactions into an outward form of communication. This step
includes verbal (linguistic tools), nonverbal (body language) and relational competence
(conveying desired relationship), that when communicated unmindfully, can cause
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misperception in the receiver when the information used to react isn’t processed fully
through the previous steps. After all of these steps, there is performative competence
which is the step where the user expresses their messages to others with the backing of
their communicative competence process (Trenholm and Jensen, 10).
This methodology helps protect negotiations against becoming ill-informed and
biased by gaining control over perceptions. Trenholm and Jensen refer to the Process of
Perception when we are recognizing and appreciating complex internal competency and
the individuality that must be taken into account (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). Their
research has shown that emotions in addition to the ‘capacity to reason’ is what creates
effective decisions (Trenholm and Jensen, 145). In the context of international
negotiations between heads of state, this method combats the truths of the Sapir-Wharf
Hypothesis, Expectancy Violations Theory, and rules of cooperative problem solving.

Figure 2.1
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The Sapir-Wharf Hypothesis states that language determines that way we interpret
the world through how we communicate ideas to one another. Otherwise known as
Linguistic Relativity (Kay and Kempton, 1984), the hypothesis claims that speakers of
different languages, and people from different cultures by extension, experience the
world differently. Language and thought are permanently interlinked and definitions
merge with thoughts until they become inseparable, as Nietzsche would agree5. The
implicit knowledge each person has from their own cumulative experiences creates their
perception of the world, and the model helps guide the analysis of this information.
Expectancy Violations Theory measures the perception of someone’s actions that
one has of another person based on their prejudice of them (Trenholm and Jensen, 76).
Whether the prejudice is positive or negative, this affects the perception of one’s actions
and hinders their ability to be understood. The theory explains that people have different
reactions between people who break the same rules or accomplish the same tasks based
on their prejudice of them before the action. If dyads in interpersonal communication are
crucial relationships that are the building blocks for lasting peace, then these aspects of
the theory must be analyzed before decisions or communications are made to harm trust
between people.
Within formalized cooperative negotiation, there are guidelines to streamline
these efforts. From the gathered literature, there seem to be five core rules for cooperation
problem solving. First, diagnosing personal goals to makes intentions clear and easy to

Although he has little to do with international relations, Nietzsche has been accredited with core findings
in inseparable bonds between language and thought and how in conjunction, they affect perception
(Nietzsche, “On the Origin of Language (1869-70)”, 1989). How heads of state create misperceptions can
also be traced back to his psychological findings within the framework of language and social norms that
unconsciously define communication.
5
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communicate. Second, making the effort to understand others’ interests and emotions will
create trust and respect between all negotiators. Third, accepting that emotions can run
high and are legitimate before formal negotiations begin. Fourth, focusing on interests
instead of positions will direct attention away from identity issues that cannot be ‘solved’
or changed within the context of conflict negotiation, if ever. Lastly, if there are impasses
in negotiations, to consider third party help to moderate and provide objective neutrality.
These five rules provide clarity into issues by acknowledging biases that could prevent
consensual problem solving.
Heads of state are susceptible to these human biases like anyone else, which is
basis of both interpersonal communication and international relations theory. The
difference is that they are incumbents of immense power positions and their decisions are
much more costly and effect many more people than whether or not a marriage ends or a
student is expelled from school6. Heads of state are at the powerful focal point of where
public and private communication meet, which means that all of their communications
are being perceived and judged. They cannot escape the context that their jobs provide,
but heads of state don’t receive training to prevent the formation of uninformed
judgements. Strategic interaction can include directives/straight stalemates, persuasion,
compliance, instrumental and relational communication, but all efforts will fail without
trust between negotiators. Interpersonal relations humanizes conflict and enables dialogue
on the pretense that all negotiators are equal in their humanity, a point which becomes
lost in political context but is undeniable in everyone’s personal perception of conflict.

6

Interpersonal communication methods are used most notably in school systems, couples’ counseling, and
domestic issues which is highlighted numerous times in Trenholm and Jensen’s works.
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In the next chapter, I will address the current and historical efforts of the United
States foreign policy to facilitate strategic communication and understand past president’s
efforts to foster trusting relationships with other countries and their leadership.
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CHAPTER THREE

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

American foreign policy has experienced many inconsistent phases over the past 70
years since the end of World War II. The United States has had to satiate the world’s
need for international leadership, as well as implement a “laissez-faire” relationship with
the global community and foster their self-sustainability. In the American government’s
attempt to satisfy both pleas, it adopted strategies of “maximalism” and “retrenchment”
that succeeded in deepening American international involvement, expanding as an
industrial powerhouse, and reassuring allies that global communism could never be
realized. After the collapse of the U.S.S.R., regional adversaries sprouted from Cold War
ashes in the Middle East and gave rise to the Global War on Terror. As the scope
widened and unipolarity was the globally accepted American position, the strategies of
maximalism and retrenchment continued to be toggled between. Although there has been
discontinuity in foreign policy strategy between administrations, I would argue that the
Trump administration has become an extreme anomaly in foreign policy change. The
early actions and rhetoric we’ve observed from the current president demonstrates the
significance of the next three to seven years he’ll hold office in reevaluating America’s
alliances, international legislation, and the country’s image on the world stage as it takes
a step back in liberal democratic leadership. This section will evaluate the successful and
misdirected policies and actions of American foreign relations over the last 70 years, and
why the president needs a formalized communication strategy. This paper will also
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chronologically describe these events in the context of maximalist, retrenchment, and
Trump’s current strategies that are unfolding.
Post-World War II era foreign policy is characterized by the success of nationbuilding and democratization in fostering new alliances. The European reconstruction era
was ultimately a win for the “maximalist” mentality for maintaining American
dominance, after employing the Marshall Plan (or the European Recovery Program,
ERP), NSC-68 and the Containment Doctrine. In the Truman Doctrine given in March
1947, President Harry Truman said, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy
of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be
able to work out a way of life free of coercion,”(Truman, pg.3) and the new hopes for the
future of Europe were realized. In this defense of international aid, Truman initiated the
Marshall Plan’s full force and international aid to bring in Europe into line with the West.
The United States initiated covert anti-communist aid and direct assistance to countries it
thought could be swayed away from the Soviets without igniting direct war with them.
The $4 billion congress gave Truman for the Marshall Plan in 1948 to rebuild its
European allies (Ambrose pg.92) so they may rejoin the ranks against a new threat in
Europe once they’ve regained hard-power and industrial abilities. In 1950, NSC-68 was
put into immediate action after the Containment Doctrine was fully realized by the
United States government on advice of the “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, by George
Kennan. In this analysis, he outlined in depth the formation of the Russian government
since its official American recognition in 1933 and its hostile views and foreign policy
goals towards the West and its capitalist agenda. The Containment Doctrine and NSC-68
were paired in initiation to positively affect the other in symbiotic positive feedback to
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convince third party countries to join the United States and other Western block states,
but most importantly, to not join the communists in Russia and secondarily in China. This
was demonstrating the active foreign policy the time called for in wake of Soviet
aggressions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe as their sphere of influence grew with
the Warsaw Pact and militaristic suppressions of insurrections within territorial influence.
This is noted as a success in maximalist thinking and a bold beginning for the American
legacy of advancing the strength our allies.
With the emergence of the Cold War came more weighted risk with major power
engagement. Due to the prevalence of nuclear arms early in the conflict, the stakes rose
quickly, causing rules of engagement to be informally set by 1949 when intelligence
became informed of the U.S.S.R.’s first nuclear weapons test. The global dichotomy was
solidified in the formation of nuclear weapons blocks as NATO was founded in 1949 and
the Warsaw Pact in 1955 when both sides had acquired staggering nuclear arsenals. The
country’s leadership in forming NATO was crucial to the Western bloc’s military and
political unity throughout the Cold War. The maximalist support was waining by the end
of Truman’s time in office when it became apparent that the nuclear arsenal growth in
Russia wasn’t noticeably decreasing and the citizens were feeling the burn in heightened
taxes going to support NATO and the UN that weren’t helping their cause. The
retrenchment strategy was first implemented in the Eisenhower administration when he
became president in 1953. Sestanovich said, “[Eisenhower] believed that Harry Truman’s
approach to national security was neither successful nor sustainable,” and that his new
administration was tasked with fixing his predecessor’s problems by having to “escape a
military stalemate, cut the cost of defense, shift burdens to allies, replace stale ideological
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rhetoric with more hopeful initiatives, and shore up domestic support.”(Sestanovich, 67)
Retrenchment strategy was another successful American foreign policy, building stable
foundations for more integrated international relations with allies in Western Europe and
Asia as he sealed peace in Korea, and avoided nuclear escalation with the U.S.S.R.
Retrenchment won many non-interventionalist battles early in the conflict. In 1956,
Eisenhower only diplomatically intervened in the seizure of the Suez Canal by AngloFrench forces, stating that this is a terrible message to be sending out to prospective allies
in the Third World and to stop their military campaign against Egypt immediately. But
the maximalist strategy pulled ahead when preservation of the Containment Doctrine
became necessary through military intervention. The Korean War was bitterly fought to
end aggressive expansion of communism in the Korean peninsula from Chinese and
Russian support of North Korea and their Leader Kim Il Sung. United Nations forces, led
predominantly by the United States, entered the war in 1950 to prevent a domino from
falling, and to provide relief to the invaded South Koreans. But in the change of the
presidency, Eisenhower ended the conflict with a ceasefire at the 38th parallel. The
Vietnam War, however, was one of the worst interventions in world history, where the
U.S. always held and carried out a maximalist interventionist view from supporting
French recolonization after the end of World War II and then the Diem regime of South
Vietnam, and finally its own military campaigns against anti-establishment guerrilla
fighters and the communist Viet Cong. This will turn into arguably the most devastating
foreign policy and military mistakes in U.S. history.
The election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 brought back the maximalist agenda by
re-embracing NSC-68 and giving full financial and political support to our allies across
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the globe. It wasn’t until the near catastrophe of October of 1962 when the Soviets moved
missiles in Cuba, that United States foreign policy perception became existentially
threatening. The reinitiating of nuclear threats caused the United States, led by President
Kennedy at this time, to reenter with full force of negotiations and militaristic
intimidations of deterrence. The maximalist method worked and the crisis ended without
nuclear war, but it once again reminded the West of the high stakes Russia was trying to
bring to the conflict and the need of active participation. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended
one part of the Cold War and opened the second part for the administrative war hawks to
administer more power in future violent conflicts with communism, particularly in the
country of Vietnam. “Two events—Vietnam and Watergate— have cast a long shadow of
our understanding of how American foreign policy unfolded in the 1970s.” (Sestanovich
192) Nixon’s Watergate scandal landed the executive branch in a period of tumult and
distrust, after having declared a resurgence of Retrenchment Strategy through the Nixon
Doctrine in trying to withdraw the United States from Vietnam. The violent ending to the
war came with a general animosity towards the United States from developing nations
after the demolition of Vietnam.
From the end of the Nixon administration through the Reagan years, the United
States foreign policy underwent a transformative process from détente strategy to a plan
to end the Cold War. Each presidency and administration adds another step in the
direction of this goal to leave this war in history from 1973 to 1989, as Reagan put it, to
make the foreign policy agenda about resolving the conflict instead of drawing out the
pain or prolonging the expensive game of attrition. Throughout this era of political
conservatism and uncertainty about the economic future, new tools of both war and
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diplomacy were implemented by the executive and legislative branches to have effective
changes in the Department of State and Department of Defense in the United States be
more influential in its areas of conflict, mainly at the end of the Vietnam War, in Eastern
Europe, the Middle East and Central America.
After Nixon’s resignation, Gerald Ford inherited much of his cabinet and his
foreign policy strategies, most influential to the relationship America had with the Third
World was his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The secretary’s statecraft tactics
throughout Nixon, Ford and Carter’s presidencies were oriented with stabilizing our
economic dependence on OPEC during the political tremors of the 1970s and to help
align Third World nations with the United States as opposed to the U.S.S.R. by resolving
regional conflict with diplomatic mediation. This primarily happened in the resolution of
the Yom Kippur War in 1973 that settled peace for Israel and the surrounding Arab
states, succeeded in negotiating "disengagement agreements" which put in place narrow
demilitarized zones between the opposing forces in the Golan Heights, and next to the
Suez Canal and began the Camp David Accords carried on by Jimmy Carter during his
presidency. This was considered a diplomatic success until the deals were annulled by the
assassination of President Sadat. During the late 1970s, the support plans for allies and
interests of the United States were executed in geographic and cultural categories in a
progressive policy strategy called “Regionalism” and was how the Arc of Crisis in 1979
was dealt with by the State Department and executive offices of President Carter. The
Arc of Crisis threw off much of what he wanted to promote in global human rights by
determining U.S. foreign aid grants and the government’s respect and protection of their
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citizens’ rights. Carter’s goals in aiming for diplomatic solutions created domestic Cold
War-weariness and economic uncertainty that elected Ronald Reagan in 1980.
Iran continues to be an enormous foreign policy issue after its deposition of the
U.S.-supported Shah regime in 1979 and installation of the new Islamic Republic under
an ayatollah, or supreme religious leader. This new regional destabilizer was opposed by
the Ba’athist Party military leader in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, who invaded Iran in
September of 1980 with the support of America in hopes of countering Iran’s
revolutionary power surge and dangerous autonomy. The war became tricky when in
1985 the United States also began selling military weapons to Iran to fund the Contras, a
Nicaraguan political military group, in the debacle referred to as the Iran-Contra Scandal,
which lasted until 1987 after Congress refused to militarily intervene in Nicaragua, which
is what Reagan suggested, saying that “the Contras are ‘moral equivalents to our
Founding Fathers’ and that ‘we owe them our help’” (Ambrose 327). This went on while
the United States simultaneously supported “Operation Staunch” which in 1983, resolved
that arms deals can only be made amongst its allies with Iraq and not Iran in this conflict
during the terrible years of this war. Both of the Iran-Contra Scandal and Operation
Staunch were morally corrupt policies that the United States carried out under Reagan’s
maximalist agenda. The insurgent wars and foreign affairs tactical decisions are
retrospectively difficult to justify, and supported by shady methods from World War II
and Vietnam-era foreign policy.
In the late 1970s, “in his relations with the Soviet Union, Carter’s major goals were
to free America from its ‘inordinate fear of Communism’ and to complete a SALT II
treaty that would reduce the chances of nuclear war.” (Ambrose 283) Reagan disagreed
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with this apparently weaker stance against Russia, and when he won adopted a cavalier
doctrine in his “Full Court Press”, as Sestanovich calls it, he would regain America’s
strong independent voice. It wasn’t until his second presidential term that he exercised
peace-oriented negotiations and began working closely with Gorbachev to make peace
between the two nations. As Ambrose states about this time, “As a second-term president,
with his last election behind him, Reagan stopped calling the Soviet Union an “evil
empire” and started indicating that he might be willing to sit down with the new Soviet
leader, Gorbachev.” (Ambrose 332) Gorbachev coming to power in 1985 was, in
retrospect, what made the difference in Soviet-American peaceful negotiations in heading
towards the end of the U.S.S.R.
After the end of Reagan’s time in office, internal U.S.S.R. conflicts were seeming
to overflow and become too much for the Central Government to control. George H.W.
Bush’s administration oversaw the world’s transition from a bipolar Cold War system to
a unipolar system with the United States at the wheel and the Soviets without unified
support. As Sestanovich puts it, he was weary to accept the Cold War was officially
ending, proceeding with caution in relations with Moscow, and focusing on German
reunification. This allowed for more negotiations on START I with Russia, that paved the
way for further improvements during the Clinton Administration after the 1992 elections.
The Clinton-Yeltsin relationship subdued international tensions and institutionalized
nuclear weapons checks to make START treaties more effective. Bill Clinton aimed to
balance the federal budget, cut military costs, and expand NATO while making the
organization act to quail the Serbs attempt at mass ethnic genocide and play a primarily
diplomatic role in the conflict’s resolution through the Dayton Accords. The historical
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account had more positive reactions in comparison to the Gulf War and the sequential
Iraq and Afghan invasions enacted by the George W. Bush administration after the terror
attacks of 9/11. Since then, the tumult of these wars has perpetuated weariness within our
allies that aren’t expressing the same confidence they had toward past administrations.
The post-9/11 Bush Doctrine, embracing unparalleled military strength for regime change
instead of diplomacy, made American Exceptionalism resurge and continue at high levels
to this present administration. The Obama Doctrine encouraged a “scaled-back energetic
interventionism” (Cole Lecture, 12/1) that was implemented through automated warfare
in the Arab Spring’s wake, especially with drone strikes in Afghanistan, Yemen, and the
new ISIS territories in Iraq and Syria that are continuously problematic for regional
stability.
In conclusion, I agree that it’s fair to say that retrenchment and maximalism both
worked at different times in foreign policy history, but were used appropriately and
intermittently, never holding to just one methodology. The Trump administration
represents a marked departure from what has come before in American international
relations. As exemplified by Dr. Ikenberry, “every U.S. president from Woodrow Wilson
to Barack Obama has maintained that an enduring community of liberal democracies
exists, and that democracies possess a unique capacity to cooperate… Trump disdains
this vision of the order, refusing to distinguish between liberal democratic friends and
autocratic rivals.” (Ikenberry, 8) Allies like Chancellor Merkel are proclaiming the U.S.
to be “unreliable for Europe” and its allies, after meeting the newly inaugurated
president. Other authors like Stewart Patrick claim that Trump in also abandoning the
U.S. global leadership position it’s held for the last 13 presidents, since Roosevelt, at a
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time when the world needs a superpower advocating for free markets, internationally
unifying treaties and combatants against climate change. His presidency follows an era of
increasing American power that “between 1993 and 2014 the United States had more
power than ever before but, in its foreign policy, experienced less success than ever
before (Mandelbaum 368). Trump is an extreme internal reaction to Americans’ warwariness, frustration with unwilling allies, and general distrust in the political and
economic systems. As President Trump continues to isolate the U.S. further from the
international community, the world will have to bear the consequences of our own past
policy mistakes.
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CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDY: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND MISPERCEPTION

China and the United States have had one of the most variable relationships in
history. The two nations have allied in battle, pitted against each other in proxy conflicts,
and ultimately engaged in enormous economic interests that’ve kept them forcibly close.
Keeping the countries apart is the inconsistency of trust and perception they have of one
another. Instability in their relationship comes from the fundamental disagreements on
governance, trade issues, geopolitical proxy conflicts, human rights, and conflicting
views on spheres of political influence. Although diplomatic, economic, and even
sporting strategies have been used to try and solve these problems, they have yielded only
temporary headway and haven’t succeeded in creating a lasting friendship.
To build a relationship based on trust and mutual understanding, it’s crucial for
these two countries to combat the forms of misperception in their negotiations. Finding
out the history of their distrust is an essential start. Beginning with birth of the
Communist Party of China in 1929 to the present, I’ll briefly discuss the periods of illcommunication and friendship between China and the United States. Bringing the trend
of misperception up to the present, the main body of my research looks at the cause-andeffect relationship that the two countries have in their international policy towards each
other and that there is more evidence of trust between them that we can expect to see
expand in the future. By following the progress of President Trump in how he navigates
his way through different types of diplomacy to work with President Xi Jinping, we
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discover the current faults that this Message-Influence Model yields (Corman et al,
2008).
According to a Council of Foreign Relations report, in 2010 China surpassed
Japan as the world’s second-largest economy after annual economic growth being
between 7 and 15% since 1992 and is further predicted to overtake the United States as
the number one economic power by 2027 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018).
China has been a permanent member on the Security Council of the United Nations since
its inception in 1945 with other emerging victors from World War II, and they’ve been a
rising military power with the world’s largest standing army in history (Gertz, The
National Interest, 2016). These achievements mark China’s determination to become the
new superpower in the world. With great strides like these, the status quo power that
China has come into competition with is the United States.
This won’t be the first time that they have faced off. Many accredited political
theorists believe that the two countries will continue conflicting with one another, or in
the most severe predictions, lead into war. Most notably, Graham Allison’s
aforementioned predictions that the two countries could fall into the Thucydides’ Trap is
among the most accredited (Allison, 2017). It’s important to outline the exact threatening
symptoms that have been exhibited in recent history that have shown incapability of
productive negotiations and avoiding conflict that could lead to violence
The two countries have been adversaries through many international conflicts
since the founding of the prevailing communist regime. The Korean War, Vietnam War,
and the Taiwanese Strait Crises have all put China and the United States at odds.
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During the Korean War, the United States and its allies in the United Nations,
Australia, Britain and France came to the aid of South Korea when the Soviet-backed
North Koreans invaded in 1950 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018). When
the South Korean alliance troops approached the Sino-Korean border, the Chinese aid to
North Korea went from financial and resource assistance to complete military
intervention. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) beat back the South Korean
alliance troops and helped the North maintain military control over their borders until the
ceasefire was signed in 1953. Since the ceasefire, China has kept its precarious
relationship with the North Korean totalitarian regime by continuing to be its number one
trade partner. As of 2016, China is responsible for 85% of North Korea’s exports and
90% of the goods that North Korea imports (World Fact Book, CIA, 2016), despite the
pressure from the international community to inforce non-exemptible global sanctions to
curb the country’s nuclear program.
The crises of the Taiwan Strait were undoubtedly the tensest times in SinoAmerican relations due to two misperceptions: the unpredictability of the Communist
state for the United States and American unwillingness to recognize the communist state
as legitimate over the nationalist party in Taiwan (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline,
CFR, 2018). After supporting both the nationalist party and the communist party forces
throughout World War II in combatting Japanese imperialist forces in China, the
American government continued supporting only Chiang Kai Shek and his nationalist
party (KMT) after the war had ended in 1945 (Tucker, 2009). Immediately following the
end of World War II, the Chinese Civil War between the communists and the nationalists
went into full thrust. Once it was clear that the communist party had gained the majority
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of the population’s support7, the war turned in favor of the communists, forcing the
nationalist leaders and their ardent supporters to flee the country to the neighboring island
of Taiwan. Since the nationalist party’s establishment of the Republic of China,
independent from the mainland People’s Republic of China (PRC) which established
itself officially in 1949, the two Chinas have been seeking recognition as the true China
by the rest of the world. After the end of the civil war, the United States and other
western powers continued supporting Taiwan as the officially recognized China. This
caused issues of political existentialism and territoriality between the two Chinas that to a
lesser degree still exist to this day (Albert, CFR, 2016). When President Eisenhower
lifted the blockade on Taiwan in August of 1953, Chaing Kai Shek gave permission for
thousands of troops to move into the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait
which were prior occupied by the communist regime. The PLA began shelling the islands
mercilessly from the mainland until the United States stepped in to threaten the PRC with
nuclear retaliation unless it ceased its attacks (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR,
2018). The United States signed a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan and the threats were
observed by the PLA. This temporarily resolved the conflict from becoming an armed
conflict, but crises similar to this involving the Taiwan Strait reoccurred in 1956 and even
as recently as 1996 (U.S. Relations with China: Timeline, CFR, 2018).
During the Vietnam War, the Viet Kong sent an envoy to China to ask for aid
against the advancing American military threat in South Vietnam (Jian, 1995). In the

Chaing Kai Shek, the Chinese nationalist party leader, was losing support fast in the countryside first,
holding on to population centers like Nanjing and Guangzhou until the final months of the war, but it’s
important to note that Chaing lost much of the popular support because of his close ties with America and
other Western powers that once forcibly colonized and manipulated much of China for its wealth in the 18th
and 19th centuries (Kenley, 2012). This is the bedrock of Chinese distrust of American influence and
Western political agenda.
7
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early 1960s when this deal was being made, Mao Zedong armed Vietnamese battalions to
prevent the American advancement on North Vietnam to protect their border region and
provide a buffer from American influence, fearing another close-to-home combat war
like what happened on the Korean Peninsula (Ross, 2001). This was an uncharacteristic
move by China, who had traditionally been an adversary of Vietnam at best for centuries,
but who distrusted American intentions more than the old enemies of China.
In addition to past close calls, two recent events sparked potential major conflicts
in bilateral relations: 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the 2001
American spy plane incident. These flash points in international relations tested the
tensions these two counties could face while still maintaining peaceful relations.
In her book Powerful Patriots: National Protest in China’s Foreign Relations,
Weiss discusses two incidents between China and the United States in great depth. The
1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Yugoslavia and the 2001 EP-3 plane collision created
great riffs in Sino-American relations but they were handled very differently domestically
in China for many reasons. The embassy bombing incident was extremely harmful to
China’s dignity and viewed as a much more serious catastrophe than the collision. Three
journalists died and 20 Chinese citizens were injured in the bombing and it inspired the
people of China to file immediately for protesting rights in front of the U.S. embassy in
Beijing. They were granting students and workers the rights to protest there for the first
time since the last ones were brutally put down at Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Weiss,
2014).
This new ability for select citizens to demonstrate against the United States was
potentially destabilizing for Chinese control. But at the same time, this was a powerful
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demonstration for Chinese international image of projecting the raw political and people
power that the government controls within its borders. It’s an intimidating visualization
for America to see so many Chinese voicing against U.S. actions. These factors brought
them back into the spotlight to apologize, but it was insufficient in the minds of Chinese
leaders and citizens, but not insincere enough to further escalate the conflict.
The EP-3 incident when an American spy plane apparently swerved into a
Chinese fighter within Chinese air space without permission, collided with the fighter,
and sent it down into the South China Sea while the spy plane requested an emergency
landing on Hainan Island in South China. This didn’t lead to uprisings to the magnitude
of the embassy bombing, but the Chinese government chose to discourage anti-American
protests. This time, because of the new “war hawk regime” of George Bush and the
threats of repeated protest exposure of Chinese citizens to these dangerous freedoms of
assembly and speech that hang in delicate balance within Chinese governance (Weiss,
2014).
With the importance of the Sino-American relationship growing politically every
year to use their powers to solve regional and world issues together, the need for renewed
and reinvigorated amicable relations between the two countries’ leadership to show that
there’s great chance for prosperity in the future. To prove the need for this, my research
maps the interactions between the Trump administration and the Xi administration in the
past year and a half of their overlapped time in office.
Sino-American Relations Research: Perception Vs. Reality
In the previous chapters, theory and history have pointed to misperception in
world politics being a deadly symptom of impending conflict. When leadership is elected
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or chosen to represent the country, they are tasked with making clear goals and upholding
peace with other nations to the best of their ability. As Morganthau stated, human nature
doesn’t want us to go to war, but when the survival of the state and national identity is
threatened, any state will do what it must to survive (Morganthau, 1978). By popular
predictions from Allison, this could mean war for China and the United States (Allison,
2017).
The research purpose was to find areas of improvement for United States foreign
policy that could prompt useful change in its communication methodology. Through the
background research laid out in previous chapters of this thesis, I hypothesize that the
basis of disagreement between China and the United States is misperception of each
other’s goals and an unwillingness to initiate understanding of the other’s perspective to
form consensus agreements. Diplomacy is a tool which allows both sides to voice their
concerns over an issue, and after the viewpoints have been expressed that concessions
would be made by both sides in order to find an agreeable solution. When two countries
believe that their goals are too different and conflict too deeply, Clausewitz’s famous
prophecy is doomed to be realized8.
Using the Office of the Press Secretary’s press releases, direct interpretation of
Trump’s diplomatic intentions from his advisors is published. These publications about
the president’s close relational encounters with President Xi Jinping of China are crucial
to developing what misperceptions are being conveyed between high level political
interactions. The Chinese Communist Party reactions are published through state

8

This refers to the famous Prussian general, Carl Von Clausewitz, when he said that “war is the
continuation of politics by other means”. This has been a keystone in realist international relations theory
since On War was first published (Clausewitz, 1908).
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sponsored media coverage of national and global events. The China Daily, an
internationally printed state-approved media conglomerate, is the publication I’ve used in
my research to determine reactions the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China has to American political actions9. The goal is to determine what events and news
was being portrayed differently in each country having to do with their bilateral relations.
Measuring the reactions of each country’s leadership toward the other is a difficult
task to take on. While reading press releases from each country, I noted each point of
perception10 by the author of the press release and categorized each point of perception as
a “New Agreement”, “Revisited Agreement”, “Revisited Disagreement”, or a “New
Disagreement”. A “New Agreement” is deemed a positive interaction between the
countries by the press release, fostering closer relations on a newly visited subject or
bilateral agreement. A “Revisited Agreement” is also positive and deemed by the press
release as a reaffirmation of a previous agreement. A “Revisited Disagreement” is a
negative interaction between the two counties that yields setbacks from friendly relations,
but that has already been established as a disagreement previously and hasn’t been
solved. Finally, a “New Disagreement” is a negative interaction that has not been
addressed before by China and the United States, which could create more problems for
relations in the future.
To quantify the qualitative data of how well an interaction went between
Presidents Trump and Xi by the Office of the Press Secretary, I assigned a points system

I’ve chosen this news agency to represent the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
because they’re owned and operated by the Communist Party of China and the State Council Information
Office and was established June 1st, 1981 by the organization to publish state news worldwide in English.
10
I define “points of perception” as the author’s written take on an event in relation to its effects on
bilateral relations between the United States and China.
9
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to the agreement options. “New Agreements” are two points, “Revisited Agreements” are
one point, “Revisited Disagreements” are negative one point, and “New Disagreements”
are negative two points. The newly visited subjects in press releases are worth two points
(positive or negative) because of the relevance to the current diplomatic climate and add
much more significance to an interaction between heads of state and their future
interactions. Communications that were documented in press releases from the Press
Secretary Office between the United States and China included State Visits, phone calls,
joint-press statements, trade agreements and memorandums, but were all scored the same
way based on the negotiations that transpired.
The language analysis in the press releases was done by referencing a phrase list
to understand how the author’s perception was taken. These analyses distinguish the
points of perception whether they fall in the contributing to the “New Agreements” which
are two points, “Revisited Agreements” which are one point, “Revisited Disagreements”
which are negative one point, and “New Disagreements” which are negative two points. I
compiled this phrase list from commonly used preambulary and operative words of the
United Nations to describe a position the author is taking in official documents. The
statements with positive and negative associations are modeled after the word list.
Leading statements are phrases from the United Nations word list that signal that a point
of perception is being formed in the sentence, but that it isn’t clear by only the phrase if
the perception of the subject is going to be positive or negative. Using the leading
statements, these are the phrases that indicate that with further context given in the
information provided on the subject in the press release that there will be a disclosed
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point of perception that can be accounted for in the data. The key word list can be found
in Appendix D.

FIGURE 4.1 – Chinese Perception towards the United States
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FIGURE 4.2 - United States Perception towards China

Results
On April 7th, 2017 at the beginning of President Trump and President Xi’s
relationship, they agreed on an annual schedule called the United States-China
Comprehensive Dialogue and has been a huge source of stability for bilateral relations.
The two presidents oversee that the dialogue is carried out and that it has four pillars: the
Diplomatic and Security Dialogue; the Comprehensive Economic Dialogue; the Law
Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue; and the Social and Cultural Issues Dialogue
(Press Secretary Spicer, 2017). For this reason, there were plenty of opportunities to
gather sufficient data to make accurate tables11 and graphs12 to display the diplomatic
events the two nations have experienced in relation to each other.
11
12

Tables used for data plotting and graphing Total Points of Perception located in Appendix A
Copies of graphs and results of the Total Points of Perception located in Appendix B
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There are several issues that have scary potential to escalate if not swayed away
from a deadly conflict that some leading academics warn about. The majority of issues
surrounding potential fields of conflict and misperception are regional geopolitical issues,
(Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula), human rights (Tibetan sovereignty, religious
freedom, minority rights), trade relations, territorial and military expansions (South China
Sea, International Law of the Sea abuse and the Diaoyudao/Senkaku Islands dispute).
These issues were the majority of what was published on in the press releases and what
caused such high-level debate.
American views of China were negative in times where there was very little direct
contact between the two presidents. It was when they were apart for several months at a
time, for example when the prospects over a trade war Trump was threatening beginning
in January where after not being in the company of the Chinese president since the state
visit in November the year before. Good relations were unfolding between the two
nations after the state visit when the two presidents met with each other’s business
leaders while in Beijing and made strides on economic cooperation. This was seemingly a
move by Xi to destress the impending political situation with the memorandum Trump
filed with the U.S. Commerce Department to investigate Chinese intellectual property
theft and manipulation within China.
The U.S. first announced the tariffs on March 1st after a U.S. Commerce Department
investigation under Section 232 of U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to the dismay of
Chinese businesses, showing a failure in Chinese diplomacy to reconcile with the
American government.
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The perceptions of China towards the United States dipped in moments of harsh
criticism that the China Daily categorized as “hypocritical and unfair” (China Daily,
April 21st, 2018). When the United States issued its annual human rights reports about
each country the previous year, China was outraged to be called a “source of instability
for the world” and was very vocal about denying this (China Daily, April 21st, 2018). In
most recent months since the beginning of 2018, China has been attempting to combat
America’s advances on the trade war Trump has progressed with targeting Chinese
companies by imposing duties of 25 percent on steel and 10 percent on aluminum to
counter cheap imports, especially from China (Reuters, 2018). These decisions were not
made by international negotiation, phone calls with China, or visits with President Xi.
Conclusion
Friendly relations between nations and heads of state are developed, or catalyzed,
by the direct contact between leaders. At the points of most contact between the
presidents were when most trade relations, regional geopolitical issues and bilateral
political relations improved most. The prospects Presidents Xi and Trump outlined for
further relations on April 7th, 2017 was an excellent model for all nations, because it
targeted the issues the two nations could profit most from discussing. This is either
because they fervently disagreed with each other on them or they both had high stakes in
continuing to strengthen their countries in this dialogue category.
My original hypothesis wasn’t disproven, because misperception continues to be a
key variable in why the two countries don’t understand the other’s actions on a certain
issue. This could be because of the communication shortfalls between the nations’ leaders
during times of high political stress. The misperception could come from the personal
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differences between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump that could have a huge influence on
the foreign policies they adopt for their countries toward each other. As was discussed in
Chapter II, Kenneth Waltz’s First Image accounts for the power human nature has in
determining whether war occurs by the authority of a single leader with a high ranking of
power (Waltz, 1959). Trump’s “America First” Doctrine, as discussed in Chapter III, has
a lot to deal with the trade war prospects and his foreign policy unilateralism, while
President Xi has also recently been granted the possibility of unlimited terms in office if
he wishes (BBC World News, 2018) as well as nearly complete centralization of power
through his designation as President of the PRC and Chair of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China.
In reference to my original thesis, I stand by what I’ve said: The United States has
a communication problem. There is a record the country holds of using its preordained
hegemonic capabilities to determine the fates of other countries, whether they comply
with the American world image or not. The Message-Influence Model that we’ve grown
accustomed to, where the President of the United States can decide to force China’s
economic hand by unilaterally slapping on tariffs to their exports by executive order, is
not harmonizing well with other countries. The frightening part is that the other countries
are catching on to this model, and they’re moving on without the United States (Frum,
2017; Simon, 2018).
The hope exists in regulating negotiations. Interpersonal Communication Theory
has given social scientists new hopes in what conflict resolution could become for
interstate relations, and it’s already being exercised in truth and reconciliation
commissions across the globe. Conflicts dealing with a government wrongdoing or non-
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state actor causing harm to a community is just a couple of the functions, but they’ve
proven to bridge gaps between communities and peoples that would have otherwise
seemed impossible13. There were Truth and Reconciliation Commissions established in
Ireland after the Good Friday Agreements became internationally recognized to heal the
communities affected by the conflict after former Maine senator and special diplomatic
envoy George Mitchell helped bring Great Britain and Ireland to peace talks moderate
their negotiation (Connolly, 2006).
These diplomatic victories don’t have to be uncommon. Most truth and
reconciliation commissions follow the basic interpersonal relations formula designed by
Trenholm and Jensen explained in Chapter II. The United States has an obligation to
choose the best methods of negotiation to benefit Americans as we do our allies, potential
friends in the international community, and to avoid war at all costs. To reinvigorate our
‘Soft Power’, American leadership must regulate its diplomatic practice and lead by
example. Promote uncovering the truth, reconciling with our adversaries, and battling the
dangerous clouds of misperception to propagate peace.
Future Work Suggestions
Finding the Chinese perception of the United States for future work is important.
This research project was designed to analyze U.S. foreign policy strategies and the need
to account for other countries’ perception of our nation.

Truth and reconciliation commissions have been working in South Africa beginning in 1994 to heal
communities after the abolition of apartheid (South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)),
as a part of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement in 2012 to bring native
populations into communities where they were relocated, to name two examples
13
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Comparing the communication strategies American executive administrations
have with different heads of state from China. This could reveal different methods not
thought of with China specifically, which could prove that this case study of the Trump
administration with the Xi administration is just an anomaly in American foreign policy
with China and its effects.
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after a US
Commerce
Department
investigation under
Section 232 of US
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APPENDIX D

United Nations Word Bank
POSITIVE

NEGATIVE

LEADING STATEMENTS

Affirming

Alarmed

Bearing in mind

Commends

Concerned

Believing

Appreciation

Deploring

Contemplating

Gratitude

Disturbed

Convinced

Satisfaction

Disagrees

Declaring

Reaffirming

Condemns

Deeply concerned

Thanking

Denounces

Deeply conscious

Agrees

Discourages

Deeply convinced

Approves

Rejects

Desiring

Endorses

Regretting

Emphasizing

Supports

Expecting

Welcoming

Fulfilling

Trusts

Fully aware
Keeping in mind

Observing
Recalling
Referring
Taking into consideration
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